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Abstract Inference versus consequence, an invited lecture at the LOGICA 1997
conference at Castle Liblice, was part of a series of articles for which I did research
during a Stockholm sabbatical in the autumn of 1995. The article seems to have been
fairly effective in getting its point across and addresses a topic highly germane to the
Uppsala workshop. Owing to its appearance in the LOGICA Yearbook 1997, Filosofia
Publishers, Prague, 1998, it has been rather inaccessible. Accordingly it is republished
here with only bibliographical changes and an afterword.
Keywords Inference · Consequence · Validity · Judgement · Proposition ·
Type theory
The following passage, hereinafter “the passage”, could have been taken from a mod-
ern textbook.1 It is prototypical of current logical orthodoxy:
The inference
(*) A1, . . . , Ak. Therefore: C
is valid if and only if
whenever all the premises A1, . . . , Ak are true, the conclusion C is true also.
When (*) is valid, we also say that C is a logical consequence
of A1, . . . , Ak.
We write A1, . . . , Ak| = C.
It is my contention that the passage does not properly capture the nature of inference,
since it does not distinguish between valid inference and logical consequence. The
1 Could have been so taken and almost was; cf. Tennant (1978, p. 2). In order to avoid misunderstanding
let me note that I hold Tennant’s book in high regard.
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view that the validity of inference is reducible to logical consequence has been made
famous in our century by Tarski, and also by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and by
Quine, who both reduced valid inference to the logical truth of a suitable implication.2
All three were anticipated by Bolzano.3
Bolzano considered Urteile (judgements) of the form
A is true
where A is a Satz an sich (proposition in the modern sense).4 Such a judgement is cor-
rect (richtig) when the proposition A, that serves as the judgemental content, really is
true.5 A correct judgement is an Erkenntnis, that is, a piece of knowledge.6 Similarly,
for Bolzano, the general form I of inference
J1, . . . , Jk
J,
where J1, . . . , Jk are judgements, becomes I′:
A1 is true, . . . , Ak is true
C is true,
where A1, . . . , Ak, and C are propositions. The inference I’ is valid when C is a
logical consequence of A1, . . . , Ak.7 This is the notion of logical consequence that
is explained in the passage: whenever all the antecedent propositions are true, the
consequent proposition C is true also.8
One should note, however, that propositions and judgements are conflated in the
passage. The relata in logical consequence are propositions, whereas an inference
effects a passage from known judgements to a novel judgement that becomes known
in virtue of the inference in question. Frege wrote:
Ein Schluss … ist eine Urteilsfällung, die auf grund schon früher gefällter Urteile
nach logischen Gesetzen vollzogen wird. Jede der Prämissen ist ein bestimmter
2 Tarski (1936); Wittgenstein, Tractatus 5.11, 5.132; Quine (1951, p. 7).
3 Bolzano (1837).
4 A proposition in the old sense is a judgement, usually of the [subject/copula/predicate] form S is P and
its linguistic correlate is a complete declarative sentence, for instance, Snow is white. A proposition in the
modern sense is not itself a judgement, but serves as the content of a judgement of the modern form A is
true. Its linguistic correlate is a that-clause, for instance, that snow is white. The term ’proposition’ without




7 Bolzano’s term was Ableitbarkeit, WL (§155(2)). The literal translation ’derivability’ would prove too
confusing against the background of current practice which uses the two metamathematical turnstiles
| = and |−. The semantic double turnstile is the analogue of Bolzano’s Ableitbarkeit, whereas the (mod-
ern, non-Fregean) single turnstile expresses syntactic derivability according to certain derivation rules.
8 As a representation of Bolzano this is substantially but not literally correct: Bolzano imposed certain
compatibility conditions on the antecedents in Ableitbarkeiten that need not detain us further in the present
context.
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als wahr anerkannter Gedanke, und im Schlussurteil wird gleichfalls ein bes-
timmter Gedanke als wahr anerkannt.9
An Erkenntnis—what is known—is a judgement and may be of the form that a prop-
osition is true.10 Such a piece of knowledge gets known, or is obtained, in an act of
judgement. Similarly, in an inference-act, the conclusion-judgement gets known on
the basis of previously known premiss-judgements: the inference is an act of mediate
judgement.
Thus we have two Bolzanian reductions, namely (i) that of the correctness of the
judgement to that of the truth of the propositional content and (ii) that of the validity
of an inference between judgements to a corresponding logical consequence among
suitable propositions. From an epistemological point of view, we get the problem that
the reduced notions may obtain blindly. This happy term was coined by Brentano for
the case when an assertion without ground happens to agree with an evidenceable
judgement.11 An example would be when I hazard a guess as to the size of the for-
tune of a former Dutch premier and by fluke happen to hit bull’s eye, even though
my knowledge of the financial situation of Dutch statesmen is nil. On the Bolzano
reduction, this unsubstantiated claim would be an Erkenntnis, in spite of its being
completely unwarranted. In the same way, an act of inference between judgements
whose contents happened to be true and happened to stand in the relation of logical
consequence would be valid, even though no epistemic warrant had been offered.
Blind correct judgement—be it mediate or not—is not to my taste, whence I am
concerned to find other explications of judgemental correctness and inferential validity
that do not admit of such blindness. By the side of Bolzano, Frege is virtually the only
other modern logician that is of any help in the philosophical study of the notion of
inference. In my opinion his much decried view that inference starts from true, nay,
known, premisses contains an important insight:
Aus falschen Praemissen kann überhaupt nichts gesclossen werden. Ein blosser
Gedanke, der nicht als wahr anerkannt ist, kann überhaupt nicht Praemisse sein.
… Blosse Hypothesen können nicht als Praemissen gebraucht werden.12
9 Frege (1906, p. 387). (My) English translation:
An inference … is an act of judgement that is drawn according to logical laws from judgements pre-
viously made. Each premiss is a certain proposition which has been recognised as true, and also in the
conclusion-judgement a certain proposition is recognised as true.
10 Following Martin-Löf (1996, p. 26), I explain a judgement in terms of the knowledge required for having
the right to make it. Alternatively the explanation might run in terms of what one has to do (namely, acquire
the knowledge in question) in order to have the right to make the judgement in question.
11 Wahrheit und Evidenz, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1974II (1930, p. 135).
12 Letter to Jourdain, Frege (1976, p. 118). (My) English translation:
Nothing at all can be inferred from false premisses. A mere thought, that has not been recognised as true,
cannot be a premiss. … Mere hypotheses cannot be premisses.
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Properly understood, this Fregean insight does not contradict Gentzen’s views—when
they are properly understood—concerning the use of assumptions within so called nat-
ural deduction derivations.13 In general these derivations depend on open assumptions:
accordingly the endfomula of a derivation-tree will express a proposition that is not
true outright, but only dependently true, that is, true, given the truth of the propositions
expressed by the assumption-formulae. Thus, the form of judgement used by Gentzen
in his system of natural deduction is not
A is true,
but
C is true, provided that A1, . . . , Ak are true.
Hence an inference effects an act of passage between known judgements of the latter
dependent form, whence there is no contradiction with Frege. In Gentzen’s sequential
version of natural deduction, on the other hand, the form of the conclusion-judgement
that is demonstrated is better thought of as being
S holds,
where the sequent S expresses a consequence.
However, in order to find further genuinely relevant views one has to turn to the
Scholastics. Towards the end of the 13th century tracts entitled De Consequentiis
begin to appear, by such authors as William of Ockham, Walter Burleigh, Richard
Billingham, Ralph Strode, John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen, Paul of Venice, …. A
consequence is a hypothetical proposition (in the old sense) which can be recognised
through the use of certain indicator words:
Indicator Example Modern analogue
Si (if) If A, then B conditional
Sequitur (follows) From A follows B consequence
Quia (because) B because A causal grounding
Igitur (therefore) A. Therefore B inference
These were all variants of one and the same notion. Thus, where today we would for-
mulate four different theories with various and sometimes conflicting principles, the
scholastics sought for principles that covered all four (modern) notions. An example
of such a principle is, of course, modus ponens, which from the premisses A and the
consequence of A and B draws the conclusion B.
Today one would say that
• a conditional is a proposition that may be true;
• a consequence is a relation between propositions that may hold14;
13 Gentzen (1934–1935); Gentzen (1936).
14 Tenere is the term that the scholastics applied to a consequentia.
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• causal grounding is a relation (between states of affairs) that may obtain;
• an inference is an act of passage from judgement(s) to judgement that may be valid.
The task I set myself is to elucidate relationship between the second and fourth notions
among these four alternatives.
One can discern two views concerning consequentia and their validity (holding) in
the medieval logical tradition:15
(i) the containment theory which was adumbrated by Peter Abelard and advocated
by “English” logicians at Padua from 1400 onwards;
(ii) the incompatibility theory, which is of Stoic origin and was advocated by Pari-
sian logicians around 1400.
Aristotle held that in a valid syllogism, when the premisses are true, necessarily the
conclusion must be true.
The Stoics refined this into:
[A. Therefore B] is valid
if and only if
A is true and B is false are incompatible.
Using elementary modal logic and Boolean combinations,
[A. Therefore B] is valid iff
¬♦ (A is true and B is false) iff
¬ (A is true and B is false) iff
 (if A is true, then B is true).
When the necessity  is read as “holds in every variant”, or “in all terms”, ordinary
(Bolzano) logical consequence is the result. Thus on the Incompatibility Theory, infer-
ential validity is reduced to the logical holding, that is, holding in all alternatives, of
the consequence from A to B:
The inference [A. Therefore B] is valid
when the consequence A| =B holds formally (in omnibus terminis).
Essentially, this is the theory that we found in Bolzano, Tarski, and Quine: the theory
from the passage is an intellectual descendant of the medieval incompatibility theory
thus construed. I am not satisfied with this reduction, though, since the above difficul-
ties concerning blindly valid inference remain unresolved. Logic is an epistemological
tool for obtaining new knowledge from known premisses. The incompatibility the-
ory does not fully acknowledge this epistemic aspect of logic: the (logical) holding
of a consequence, as well as propositional truth, will (in general) be “evidence tran-
scendent”.16 In modern terms the incompatibility theory pertains not so much to the
validity of inferences as to the (logical) holding of consequences.
Inference, like judgement, is primarily an act: one draws an inference and makes a
judgement.17 We have the diagram:
15 The distinction was drawn by Martin (1986, pp. 564–572), and used by Boh (1993).
16 The felicitous term ’evidence transcendent’ derives from the realism/anti-realism debate: cf. Wright
(1987, p. 2).
17 Cf. the quote from Frege (1906) offered at footnote. 9.
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The object, however, is not the only objective correlate of the act. Coupled to the
exercised act, the subject(ive) process, there is also the objective signified act, that is,
the trace, or track, of the subjective act:18
When applied to a concrete example, for instance, the preparation of a Sauce Béar-
naise, this abstract scheme becomes concrete as:
As we see the act-trace can be taken in two senses:
(i) as the actual (concrete) trace of the exercised act, and
(ii) as the blue-print of the signified act.19
This battery of distinctions can now be applied to the act of demonstration (judgement):
The object (product) of an act of judgement (demonstration) is the judgement made
(theorem proved). Also an act of inference, though, has a theorem (judgement) as its
product. An inference-figure is not so much the product as the trace of an act of
inference. An inference, be it immediate or not, is a mediate act of judgement. Infer-
ences are discursive (acts of) judgement. Immediate, or intuitive, acts of judgement,
on the other hand, have axioms as products, that is, known judgements that rest upon
no other knowledge. Following Martin-Löf, a judgement is actually true when it is
18 I am indebted to Per Martin-Löf for drawing my attention to this notion of an act-trace. He spoke about
it in an as yet unpublished lecture in Paris, April 1992.
19 Concerning ‘The distinction actus exercitus/actus significatus in medieval semantics’, see Nuchelmans
(1988, pp. 57–90).
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known (evident) and potentially true when it can be made evident (is evidenceable,
justifiable, warrantable, demonstrable, knowable, etc.).20 This notion of potential truth
of a judgement corresponds to the “objective correctness” of a statement or assertion
that is familiar from the anti-realist literature.21
With these distinctions at our disposal we can now deal with the other proposal for
inferential validity, namely the Containment Theory:
An inference is valid when the conclusion is “contained” (in some suitable sense)
in the premisses.
Already Aristotle used an idea of this kind when he wished to ground the validity of
a syllogism in the existence of a chain of linking terms.
It is often said that a valid inference is a truth-preserving one. What kind of truth
has to be preserved? True propositions? Actually true judgements? Objectively correct
judgements? Preservation of propositional truth can hardly be what is at issue here:
that gives us not the validity of an inference, but the holding of a consequence. Pres-
ervation of actual truth for judgements is also ruled out as an explication of inferential
validity. On such an account the completely general inference I above would be valid
when the premisses J1, . . . , Jk are unknown.
Preservation of objective correctness, that is, potential truth for judgements, is the
only viable option. The question remains how such truth is going to be preserved from
the premisses to the conclusion of a valid inference. Scholastic logic proves helpful
also here. Robert Kilwardby (ca. 1215–1279) writes:
Consequence is twofold, namely essential or natural, as when a consequent is
naturally understood in its antecedent, and accidental consequence.22
This, I take it, is an early formulation of the reduction of valid inference to analytic
containment: when the premisses of the inference are understood and known, and the
conclusion is understood, that is, one knows the definitions of the essences of the
terms that occur in the conclusion, nothing more is called for in order to come to
know the conclusion. It is analytically contained in the premisses. We have then an
instance of an inference per se nota, whose evidence is not founded upon anything but
the knowledge of the terms out of which the judgements of the inference has been put
together: the inference accordingly rests upon evidentia ex terminis.
In his attack upon the notion of analyticity, Quine remarked that
meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference
and wedded to the word.23
20 Martin-Löf (1998).
21 Dummett (1976, pp. 119–120).
22 Quoted from Bochenski (1970, §30.07, p. 190). Latin text in Kneale and Kneale (1961, p. 275).
23 Quine (1963, p. 22).
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This linguistic turn transforms the evidence conferred through the understanding of
natures (essences) into “self-evidence in virtue of meaning”.24 Not every inference,
though, will be conceptually self-evident from meaning. Only an immediate inference,
that is, an inference that is not supportable further by other inferences has this charac-
ter. Examples are the standard introduction and elimination rules for the intuitionistic
logical constants.25
Consider the completely general inference-figure I once more:
J1, . . . , Jk
J.
What does it mean for I to be valid?26 We consider how an inference according to I
is used. In such use one takes it for granted that the premisses J1, . . . , Jk are known
and goes on to obtain knowledge of J. Thus, under the epistemic assumption that
the judgements J1, . . . , Jk are all known, one has to make the judgement J known.27
Given the knownness of J1, . . . , Jk, the knowability of J is secured through a chain of
immediately evident axioms and inferences that begins in the premisses and ends in
the conclusion. In order to have the right to infer according to I, one must posses the
chain in question. When such a chain can be found, the inference-schema (as signified
act) is potentially valid. For the exercised act this is not enough: then one needs the
actual validity. One must actually possess the chain of immediate evidences, be they
24 Evidence is here taken in the sense of the property of being evident and not in the sense support for the
truth of a proposition.
25 See Martin-Löf’s (1996) treatment. The justification of the elimination rules in terms of the introduction
rules does not constitute a derivation of the former from the latter. To know the meaning of an intuitionistic
propositional connective C is to know how canonical, that is, introductory, proof-objects for propositions of
C-form may be put together (and when two such introductory proofs are equal). That knowledge is enough
to make plain the validity of the (immediate) elimination inferences. Note further that the introduction-
/elimination-rule distinction operates on two different levels. On the one hand, on the level of propositions,
it concerns how propositional proof-objects may be put together; for instance when a is a proof-object for
A and when b is a proof-object for b, then &I(A, B, a, b) is a proof-object for A&B. On the other hand, at
the epistemic level of judgements and inferences, it concerns for instance the inference rules
A is true, B is true. Therefore: A&B is true
and
A&B is true. Therefore: B is true,
or, when we use the fully explicit for of judgement including the proof-objects:
c:A&B
q(c):B
26 Martin-Löf’s (1987) notion “validity of a proof” is different from the validity of an inference. The former
notion results from applying the notion of rightness to proofs: a valid (right, real, true, conclusive, …) proof
is one in which each axiom really is true and each inference really is valid.
27 Note the difference between alethic assumptions that propositions are true and epistemic assumptions
that judgements are known (knowable). The former are used in natural-deduction consequences between
propositions. The latter are used when making evident the validity of inferences.
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axiomatic or inferential, and actually carry out each of the immediate component steps
thereof.28
1 Afterword
1.1 Implication, conditional and consequence
Inference versus consequence stressed the distinction between inference from judge-
ment to judgement and (logical) consequence among propositions, while resisting the
customary reduction of inferential validity to the holding of consequence, be it logical
or not, that is, the blind preservation of truth from antecedent propositions to conse-
quent proposition, possibly under all variations. Other articles of mine considered also
the implicational proposition, and drew a further distinction between open and closed
consequences, which are connected to the two different styles of natural deduction
derivation that are familiar from the works of Genzten.29
The vernacular conditional is naturally expressed by means of an if-then con-
struction. This mode of expression, however, prevents the conditional from taking
that-clauses as arguments: complete declaratives are called for, for instance, as in:
If grass is green, then snow is white,
whereas nonsense result from using that-clauses:
If that grass is green, then that snow is white.
Here we have to draw upon truth in order to restore grammaticality:
If that grass is green is true, then that snow is white is true.
Accordingly, when A and B are propositions, the conditional is regimented as:









The conditional is a form of judgement: just as we get a judgment
A is true
by applying the form
28 The picture outlined in the present paper is presented in more detail in my articles (1996, 1998, 2000).
29 See also Sundholm (1997, 2006).
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… is true
to the proposition A, a judgement
B is true, on condition that A is true,
results from applying the dependent form of judgement
… is true, on condition that A is true
to the proposition B. As a suitable notation we may here use
B true (A true),
mirroring the notation of Martin-Löf’s type theory for dependent objects in contexts
c:C (x1: A1, . . . , xk: Ak),
that is, c is a proof of C, on condition (assumption) that x1, . . . , xk , respectively, are
proofs of A1, . . . , Ak, which corresponds to the general dependent truth
C is true, on condition that A1 is true…Ak is true.30
Gentzen’s notion of a sequent (German Sequenz)  → C, where  stands for a list of
propositions, indicates a relation of consequence between the antecedent proposition
and the consequent proposition C. Accordingly we have here yet another extension of
the form of judgement
proposition A is true
into
sequent  → C holds,
where A is true may now be seen as the special sequent case with an empty list of
antecedents:
→A holds.
The implication, finally, is a proposition (A ⊃ B) that is made up from the connective
⊃ and the constitutive propositions A and B.
The Bolzano reductions of inferential validity can be expressed using either of these
three notions at the level of propositions. Commonly, the inference I is said to be valid
if the matching sequent A1, . . . , Ak → C holds logically, “in all variations”, but one
could equally well use the logical truth of an iterated implication, and similarly for
the dependent logical truth in all variations of the conditional B true (A1 true, …, Ak
true). One reason why it has proved difficult to tell these notions—implication, con-
ditional, consequence—apart is that the matching judgements, as to truth, dependent
truth, and holding, are equiassertible, that is, if one is assertible, then so are the other
two. Furthermore, they, as well as the inference I of the conclusion C true, from the
premises A1true, …, Ak true, are all refuted by the same counter-example, namely a
situation in which the antecedent propositions are true and the consequent is false.
30 See also the explanation of x + 5:N (x:N) in Sect. 1.3 below.
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1.2 Constructive semantics and verification objects
My preferred constructive semantics, namely that of Per Martin-Löf, explains the
notion of a proposition via the “Curry-Howard isomorphism”.31 To each proposition
A belongs a type Proof(A) explained in terms of how canonical proof-objects for A
may be put together from their parts (and what it is for two canonical proofs of A
to be equal). In order to assert that the proposition A is true, it is not necessary to
possess a canonical, or direct, proof of A; an indirect proof, such as those given by the
elimination rules for the logical connectives, will also do, provided only that it admits
evaluation to canonical form. Thus, for example, the crucial clause for implication says
that, given a dependent proof-object b:Proof(B) (x:Proof(A)) one obtains a canonical
proof-object for the proposition A ⊃ B by means of the ⊃-introduction rule:
⊃ I (A, B, (x)b) : Proof(A ⊃ B).
Here (x)b is a function obtained by abstraction from the dependent object b and, when
a:Proof(A), it obeys the evaluation rule (x)b(a) =df b[a/x]:Proof(B). Accordingly, we
may justify the elimination rule ⊃ E (A, B, c, a):Proof(B), where c:Proof(A ⊃ B)
and a:Proof(A), as follows. Since c is a proof-object it admits evaluation into canonical
form:
c =⊃ I (A, B, (x)b):Proof(A ⊃ B), for a suitable b. Hence,
⊃ E (A, B, c, a)=⊃ E(A, B,⊃ I (A, B, (x)b), a)= (x)b (a)= b [a/x] :Proof (B),
because b is a dependent proof of B, given x:Proof(A). This equation, as those schooled
in the proof theory of Natural Deduction will recognize, is nothing but a linearization
of Prawitz’s ⊃-reduction.32
The assertion conditions for conditionals and consequences also ask for suitable
verification objects. The conditional B true (A true) is verified by a dependent proof-
object
b:Proof(B)(x:Proof(A)),
whereas the judgement sequent A → B holds is verified by a (higher-level) function,
or mapping,
f:Proof(A) → Proof(B).
1.3 Different notions of function
These verification objects are all functions, but belong to different notions of func-
tion that are well known from the mathematical literature.33 The verification objects
31 See Martin-Löf (1984), Nordström et al. (1990), and Ranta (1994), for details and notations.
32 Prawitz (1971, 3.3.1.3, p. 252).
33 Rüthing (1984) offers a survey of different classical definitions of the notion of a function.
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of conditionals are dependent objects of lowest level, that is, they are Euler(–Frege)
“unsaturated” functions, which are given by analytical expressions in free variables,
for instance, x + 5:N(x:N), that is, x + 5 is a natural number given that (on condi-
tion that) x is a natural number, and application goes via substitution, for instance
(x + 5)[2/x] = (2 + 5) = 7. Similarly, the verification object of consequences are
independent objects of higher level, that is, Riemann–Dedekind(–Church) general
mappings, for instance (x)x + 5:N → N is obtained by (“lambda”-) abstraction, and
application goes via the primitive notion of application, (x)x + 5(2):N, for which, in
the present case, we may draw upon the properties of abstraction and substitution to
obtain (x)x + 5(2) = (x + 5)[2/x] = 2 + 5 = 7.34
Finally, the proof-objects of implications are courses-of-value (“graphs”), that is,
elements λ (A, B, (x)b)of -sets, and where application goes via an “application func-
tion” ap(x, y).35 Frege’s use of courses-of-value ε’ϕ(ε) and the concomitant application
function x∧y such that a∧ε’ϕ(ε) = ϕ (a), according to the Grundgesetze theorem that
is a direct consequence of the fatal Grundgesetz V, is also of this kind. Similarly, the
modern set-theoretic construal of functions as sets of ordered pairs that are unique in
the second component needs to be supplemented with an application function, which
itself cannot be construed as a set of ordered pairs. Here, for instance, Whitehead and
Russell, Von Neumann, Bernays, Gödel, Quine, Shoenfield and Takeuti get it right,
using, say, an elevated comma as application function x′y, for when x and y are sets.36
For sets f which are function graphs, f′a is then the second component b of the unique
ordered pair 〈a,b〉 that belongs to the function graph f. However, on their own, graphs
are just sets and cannot play the role of mappings.
1.4 Bolzano, Frege, and Gentzen
Bolzano’s (1837) account of Ableitbarkeit, when taken in the sense oflogisch ana-
lytisch, is a(n almost perfect) account of a consequence’s holding logically. Today,
after Gentzen, the consequent of a multiple conclusion consequence A1, . . . , Ak →
B1, . . . , Bm is taken disjunctively, as A1& · · · &Ak ⊃ B1∨· · ·∨Bm, whereas Bolzano
preferred to read such consequences conjunctively as A1& · · · &Ak ⊃ B1& · · · &Bm.
Furthermore, he also insisted that the antecedent propositions be compatible, a demand
dropped by Gentzen.37 Frege, on the other hand, did NOT consider (logical) conse-
quence, but inference only, concerning which much criticism, for instance, by Dum-
mett (1973, p. 309ff), has come his way. However, when we consider that Frege was
not concerned with the alethic notion of consequence, but with the epistemic notion of
inference, much of the criticism is beside the mark. In fact, it is only with Gentzen’s
(1936) sequential account of Natural Deduction—from his first consistency proof for
arithmetic—that we get a theory that is able to cope both with inference and with conse-
quence. Gentzen’s account also makes it clear that holding of consequence, rather than
34 See Nordström et al. (1990, Chap. 3) and Ranta (1994, §8.2).
35 See Ranta (1994, p. 165).
36 See, for instance, Shoenfield (1967, p. 245).
37 See Siebel (1996) for an excellent study of of Bolzano’s notion.
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logical holding in all variations, is the central notion.38 After all, his natural deduction
sequents hold arithmetically, but certainly not in all variations. For instance, the rule
of complete induction
where a is an eigen-parameter, does not hold in all variations, but only arithmetically:
when both premises hold arithmetically, then so does the conclusion.
1.5 Holding in “all variations”
The scholastics already knew that a consequence could hold in all terms—the Latin
tag is tenetur in omnibus terminis. Such consequences were called formal. Terms,
as they knew, can be taken in various suppositions, to wit material (syntactic), sim-
ple (conceptual), and personal (referential) supposition.39 Modern theories of con-
sequence to a surprising degree match these different kinds of variation. The theory
of Carnap from Logical Syntax varies syntactic terms in material supposition, there
called the formal mode of speech.40 Bolzano’s account varies Vorstellungen an sich
(ideas-in-themselves) that are counterparts of words at the conceptual level, whence
in suppositio simplex. Finally, Wittgenstein in the Tractatus varies components in the
world, as does Tarski’s model-theoretic account, whence the terms have referential
use (“personal suppositions”).41
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